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COMMENTS
SWINGING FOR THE FENCES: HOW
COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC.
MISSED THE BALL ON DIGITAL
SEARCHES
Vincent Angermeier ∗
This Comment offers a critical analysis of the recent decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc. First, the Comment discusses the facts of the case and the
decisions leading up to the en banc decision. The Comment goes on to
review the evolution and purposes of the plain view doctrine. The Comment
then argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc. represents an overreaction to the privacy concerns raised by
the application of the plain view doctrine to digital searches. Finally, it
will advocate that courts continue to apply the plain view doctrine to digital
searches, subject to heightened scrutiny by judges, who should grant
warrants only when it is reasonable to do so in light of the strength of the
probable cause, the severity of the crime being investigated, and voluntary
actions taken by the government to reduce the social cost of the privacy
intrusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
As digital technology has become ubiquitous and inexpensive, more
and more criminals leave digital trails. However, those trails commonly
∗
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.S. University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Special thanks to Professors Ronald J. Allen and Albert Alschuler for
their help and feedback. Additional thanks to the past and present staff of the Journal for
their ongoing fight against formatting errors, unsupported statements, and scrambled syntax.
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lead through large databases, filled with data unrelated to any crime and
bearing a high expectation of privacy. This poses a serious challenge to
investigators attempting to retrieve the relevant data using a minimum
amount of time and with the respect for the privacy of those searched that
the Constitution requires. Because digital records are fungible and easily
disguised or hidden, these searches sometimes require a file-by-file search
of seized databases, forcing increased expenditures on conducting the
search and increased privacy intrusions. This has challenged trial and
appellate courts to develop a practical approach to preserving civil rights
against unreasonable searches and unparticularized searches.
A recent en banc Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., attempted to do just that, adopting a
series of procedural requirements for digital searches in criminal cases that
appear to provide strong protections for digital privacy at the cost of placing
a significant burden on the ability of law enforcement to pursue digital
crimes. 1 This Comment will argue that, although digital searches raise
valid Fourth Amendment concerns, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is
excessive and inefficient, and that a more flexible approach, based on the
balancing of government interests, privacy interests, and the probability of a
successful search, is preferable. Part II will review the facts and procedural
history of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. Part III will briefly revisit the
history of the plain view doctrine and evaluate its applicability to digital
searches. Part IV will discuss the variety of approaches proposed by other
courts and scholars. Finally, Part V will argue that the most efficient
approach to regulating digital searches is one where courts balance privacy
interests with society’s interests in detecting crime and encourage
investigators to offer search methods that are respectful of privacy interests
as well as reasonably efficient and effective. Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. holding fails to strike
a proper balance and is as a result impractical and inefficient.
II. THE BALCO INVESTIGATION AND COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC.
In August 2002, the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal
Investigations Unit began a grand jury investigation into the Bay Area Lab
Cooperative (BALCO). 2 BALCO was a small lab which had several highprofile athletes as clients, including Barry Bonds, a Major League Baseball
1
579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.) (en banc), rev’g 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
2006) (2–1).
2
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter CDT I]; MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS 153
(2006).
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player who hit a record seventy-three home runs during the 2001 season. 3
Federal investigators suspected that BALCO had provided Bonds and other
athletes with performance-enhancing drugs. 4 They soon confronted the
owner of BALCO, Victor Conte, who confessed to having developed and
distributed two performance-enhancing drugs, known as “The Clear” and
“The Cream.” 5 The investigation expanded its focus to the athletes who
had been using those chemicals. A grand jury convened in September 2003
and began subpoenaing athletes with connections to BALCO. 6
In November 2002, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on
Major League Baseball (MLB), seeking drug testing information for ten
players. 7 It also subpoenaed the records of the ten players from two drug
testing companies retained by MLB to carry out its drug testing policies:
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT) and Quest Diagnostic Labs
(Quest). 8 The Major League Baseball Players Association (Players
Association) filed a motion to quash the subpoenas in the Northern District
of California. 9
While the Northern District considered that motion, the Government
requested a search warrant from magistrate judges in the Central District of
California and the District of Nevada. 10 The warrants authorized the
seizure of drug test records and specimens for the ten BALCO-connected
players, as well as materials explaining CDT’s procedure for administering
the MLB drug-testing program, including correspondence and e-mails. 11
The Government executed the warrant at CDT, where it obtained records
listing the players that CDT had tested along with the identifying numbers
CDT used to label their documents and information.12 A CDT director also
provided the agents with a physical document that contained testing results
3

FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 153; CDT I, 473 F.3d at 920.
FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 153.
5
Id. at 178. “The Clear” was a norbothelone, an obscure anabolic steroid not detected by
most steroids tests at the time. Id. at 57. “The Cream” was a mix of testosterone and
epitestosterone designed to conceal the use of norbothelone. Id. at 178.
6
Id. at 190. The athletes came from a wide variety of sports including baseball, football,
Olympic track and field, professional boxing, swimming, cycling, and bodybuilding. Id.
7
CDT I, 473 F.3d at 920. The Government initially subpoenaed eleven players’ records,
then notified CDT that they were no longer seeking records for one of those players. Id. at
920 n.7.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 921. The decision also discussed the standing of the Players Association to sue
on behalf of the players and MLB, but that subject is not otherwise discussed in this paper.
See id. 925–26.
10
Id. at 921.
11
Id. at 924.
12
Id. at 922.
4
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for the ten BALCO players. 13 When another director informed the agents
that the digital records of CDT’s drug testing programs were maintained on
a computer directory called the “Tracy” directory, an agent created a digital
copy of the directory for analysis off-site. 14
A. DISTRICT COURT

The Players Association filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(g) in the Central District of California, asking for the return of
the electronic records not related to the BALCO players.15 The motion was
granted by Judge Cooper, who rejected the Government’s argument that the
electronic documents seized were legally seized as plain view contraband
and therefore not subject to a 41(g) motion. 16 The Players Association filed
a similar order in the District of Nevada (where Quest is located), which
was granted by Judge Mahan. 17 In granting the motion, Judge Mahan found
that “[t]he government callously disregarded the affected players’
constitutional rights” and had not followed the Ninth Circuit’s procedural
guidelines for searches of intermingled records laid out in United States v.
Tamura. 18 He also found that the Government had misled the magistrate
judge in obtaining the warrant by claiming that the records were in danger
of being destroyed. 19
B. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING INC. I

The Government appealed the orders of Judges Cooper and Mahon
and the appeals were consolidated and heard by a Ninth Circuit panel. 20
The panel reversed the lower court orders.21 The majority opinion held that
the district court had improperly granted the 41(g) motions. It noted that
13
14
15

Id.
Id. at 922–23.
Id. at 923. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) provides:

Motion To Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property
or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed
in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual
issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property
to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use
in later proceedings.
16

CDT I, 473 F.3d at 924.
Id.
18
Id. The procedural requirements of United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1982), are discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.
19
CDT I, 473 F.3d at 930.
20
Id. at 915–16.
21
Id. at 930.
17
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the judges’ orders, which required the return of all CDT and Quest records,
were inconsistent with precedent. 22 It further noted that courts typically
deny 41(g) motions in situations where “the government’s need for the
property as evidence continues” even though some unlawfully obtained
evidence may be intermingled. 23 The panel also held that the Tamura
procedures were “pragmatic” rather than constitutional in nature and thus
not required. 24 The majority declined to decide whether or not the “plain
view” exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, noting that the
documents seized by the Government had been within the scope of their
warrant. 25
C. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. II

The case was reheard en banc by the Ninth Circuit where, writing for
the majority, Chief Judge Kozinski reversed the decision of the three-judge
panel. 26 The opinion reviewed the Government’s actions in the context of
its previous decision, United States v. Tamura. 27 That case stemmed from a
government kickback investigation into a manager (Tamura) at an
American company. 28 The Government obtained a search warrant to seize
The necessary records were
particular records at the company. 29
intermingled with non-pertinent records and required a multi-step process to
identify and segregate. 30 In order to avoid several days of searching for
documents on-site, the Government decided to seize all of the corporation’s
records for the relevant time periods. 31 The search ultimately supplied
evidence relevant to the investigation.32 Tamura sought to suppress the
evidence after the Government failed to return segregated non-pertinent
files to the corporation. 33 The court held that the Government’s “wholesale
seizure” of documents not specified in the warrant constituted an

22

Id. at 937.
Id. (quoting United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 388 (9th Cir. 1996)).
24
Id. at 938.
25
Id. at 935 n.39.
26
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) [hereinafter CDT II].
27
Id. at 998 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982)).
28
Tamura, 694 F.2d at 594.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 594–95.
31
Id. at 595. The court ultimately concluded that the Government’s actions did not
constitute a reversible error. Id. at 597.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 594–95.
23
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“investigatory dragnet” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 34 The
decision endorsed an approach described by the American Law Institute’s
Model Code for Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which states that once police
seize intermingled documents, they are to be held under seal and cannot be
searched until a neutral magistrate conducts a hearing on the least intrusive
method for searching the files. 35
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. en banc panel noted that the
point of the Tamura procedures was to “maintain the privacy of materials
that are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid turning a limited
search for particular information into a general search.” 36 It found that the
Government’s decision to conduct a search of the entire hard drive with the
discretion to exercise plain view was incompatible with this purpose. 37
Based on this observation and other issues related to the Government’s
failure to appeal in a timely manner, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court orders. 38 In addition, in a section titled “Concluding Thoughts,” it
laid out several holdings describing a set of procedures that magistrate
judges and government investigators must “be vigilant in observing” when
searching intermingled electronic data.
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view
doctrine in digital evidence cases.
2. Segregation and redaction must either be done by specialized personnel or an
independent third party . . . . If the segregation is to be done by government computer
personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will
not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of
the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information
as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the
information for which it has probable cause and only that information may be
examined by the case agents.

34

Id. at 595.
Id. at 595–96 (citing Section SS 220.5 of the 1975 ALI MODEL CODE
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE).
36
CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1007.
35
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5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return
non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed when they have done so
and what was kept. 39

The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision is a radical approach
to maintaining the protections of the Fourth Amendment in a digital age and
has attracted a significant amount of attention from legal commentators. 40
39
Id. at 1006 (internal citations omitted). Shortly prior to the publication of this
Comment, the Ninth Circuit revisited its decision. United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 2010 WL 3529247 (9th Cir. Sept. 13,
2010), revising and superceding 579 F.3d at 989 [hereinafter CDT III]. The revised opinion,
now per curiam, still reversed the CDT I opinion, however, much of Judge Kozinski's
mandatory language was moved to a concurrence section, joined by Judges Kleinfeld, W.
Fletcher, Paez, and M. Smith, indicating that Judges Graber, Wardlaw, and Berzon, had
withdrawn their support for that section. Id. at *1, *14; see also Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit
Balks in BALCO Case, Denying Super En Banc in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing but Amending Opinion to Remove Challenged Section, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Sept. 13, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/13/ninth-circuit-balks-in-balco-casedenying-super-en-banc-in-united-states-v-comprehensive-drug-testing-but-amendingopinion-to-remove-challenged-section/. In the new opinion, Judge Kozinski recharacterized
the guidance procedures as a “safe harbor” for government searches. CDT III, 2010 WL
3529247 at *14. Nonetheless, the concurrence implies that a failure to follow the guidance
would result in a “significant” decrease in the odds of a district or magistrate judge's warrant
being deemed reasonable. See id. (“[H]eeding this guidance will significantly increase the
likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage that they authorize will be
deemed reasonable and lawful.”). The holding, as revised, is now somewhat ambiguous.
Read narrowly, the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision now stands primarily on the
failure of the Government to comply with the Tamura procedures, which themselves
preclude “plain view” as a justification for seizure. Id. at *6. What remains unclear is what
specific set of circumstances trigger Tamura procedures. Clearly, seizure of intermingled
documents in the possession of a third party will be certain to trigger Tamura, since those
were the circumstances of both Tamura and Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. But the court
implies that it might also be triggered in first-party instances, since it cites to United States v.
Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004), which was such a case. Id. at *6.
Alternatively, Tamura may be triggered by the removal of intermingled documents to a
government facility. See CDT III, 2010 WL 3529247 at *5 (“No doubt in response to [the
Tamura precedent], the government here did seek advance authorization for sorting and
segregating the seized materials off-site.”). However, whether or not this disincentivization
of removal will solve the Fourth Amendment challenge posed by digital evidence seems
unclear, and the decision may simply encourage the government to engage in on-site digital
forensic investigations whenever possible in order to avoid triggering Tamura procedures.
40
See, e.g., Recent Case, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (2010); John R. Emshwiller,
Currents—Law Journal: Courts Wrestle with Searches When the Evidence Is Digital, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 24, 2009, at A17 (“A recent ruling by the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed this question, and the decision could reshape what government investigators can—
and can’t—do when searching digital devices for evidence of crime.”); Welcome to the
Digital Fourth, SIMPLE JUSTICE, (Aug. 28, 2009), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2009/08/28/
welcome-the-digital-fourth.aspx; Ashby Jones, Beyond A-Rod and ManRam: Plain Talk on
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Its holdings attempt to create a firewall between investigators and digital
information not specified in the warrant. By forcing investigators to waive
plain view claims, it seeks to further ensure that evidence of crimes
discovered during a digital search will only be admitted if the evidence was
described with particularity in the warrant. Further still, by requiring the
search to be conducted by a technician sworn to secrecy, it creates an
additional barrier to the use of plain view to justify seizures since
information not particularized in the warrant never reaches investigators.
Instead, the non-pertinent information (no matter how incriminating) is
limited to the specialists, who must disregard it. It also demands that
magistrate judges be presented with search protocols designed to uncover
“only” the information sought, although it is unclear how literally this
holding is to be interpreted. 41
Judge Kozinski’s decision reflects a sharp skepticism towards the use
of digital plain view, which may reflect a general concern that “plain view
is killing the Fourth Amendment” in general.42 The Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc. holding represents a much more aggressive response to the
Fourth Amendment implications of computer searches than the decisions
from any other federal court and carries serious implications. 43 Forcing
government agents to waive plain view arguments may lead to serious
crimes going unprosecuted. The other procedures dictated by the holding
the ‘Plain View Doctrine,’ WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2009, 12:40 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/28/beyond-a-rod-and-manram-plain-talk-on-the-plainview-doctrine/ (reprinting comments of Professor Peter Henning) (“While I suspect
prosecutors can live with the other requirements the Ninth Circuit imposed, giving up the
plain view doctrine is going to be a non-starter. That requirement may well cause the
government to take the case to the Supreme Court.”); Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Enacts
Miranda-Like Code for Computer Search and Seizure, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Aug. 26,
2009, 1:38pm), http://volokh.com/posts/1251308337.shtml.
41
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision represents a fairly clear break with
prior Ninth Circuit precedents. Judge Callahan, writing in dissent, catalogued several. CDT
II, 579 F.3d 989, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887–88 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to impose heightened Fourth
Amendment protections in computer search cases as a result of a computer’s ability to store
large amounts of potentially intermingled information, and stating that such heightened
protections must be “based on a principle that is not technology-specific”); United States v.
Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding digital plain view when seizure of hardware
was supported by a reasonable explanation); United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 837 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
42
See United States v. Lemus, 569 F.3d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying en banc
appeal) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Plain view is killing the Fourth Amendment. Because
our plain-view case law is so favorable to the police, they have a strong incentive to
maneuver into a position where they can find things in plain view, or close enough to lie
about it.”).
43
See infra Part IV.A.
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have invited comparisons to the complex procedural requirements of United
States v. Miranda, 44 and have been enacted with little mention of
practicality. 45 To help place this decision in context, a brief summary of
plain view doctrine and the approaches to digital searches adopted by other
courts follows.
III. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE AND SEARCHES
Plain view doctrine is a longstanding concept within search and
seizure law. 46 It is one of several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,
which requires warrants in most searches and seizures.47 The exception
permits warrantless seizure of evidence that is: (1) found during a prior
justified intrusion; (2) in plain view; and (3) incriminating in a manner that
is “immediately apparent.”48 It is “grounded on the proposition that once
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s
privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of
title and possession but not privacy.” 49 Since plain view is at the core of the
Ninth Circuit’s concerns regarding digital searches, a brief review follows.
A. COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

One of the earliest cases clearly defining and justifying the plain view
doctrine is Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 50 The case dealt with the seizure

44

Kerr, supra note 40.
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 15–18, United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-10061, 05-15006, 05-55354) (providing
a discussion of the difficulties of applying the case officer technician firewall).
46
See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1026, 1066 (1765) (Lord Camden)
(“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”).
47
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(good faith error); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consent); Hester v. United States
265 U.S. 57 (1987) (open fields doctrine); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
(exigent circumstances); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk exception); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967) (“hot pursuit” of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (imminent destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (automobile exception); see also THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 8–9, 75–114 (2009) (listing the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement and attributing their development as a response to the
creation of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
48
See Howard E. Wallin, Plain View Revisited, 22 PACE L. REV. 307, 307 (2002)
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971)).
49
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
50
403 U.S. at 443. The Court had previously decided several cases permitting police to
lawfully seize articles of an “incriminating character” not specified in the warrant being
executed. Id. at 465 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
45
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of a car on the property of a murder suspect. 51 The Court held that the
“plain view” doctrine permits unwarranted seizures of clearly incriminating
evidence under certain circumstances. 52 The Court justified this principle
by first noting that the warrant requirement serves two specific purposes:
eliminating searches not based on probable cause and limiting searches
such that the warrants do not resemble the colonial practice of issuing
“general warrants.” 53 It reasoned that permitting the seizure of objects in
plain view does not violate the first objective, since the view is predicated
on the exercise of a lawfully obtained search warrant based on probable
cause. 54 It then reasoned that the second objective was also satisfied
because the initial intrusion was justified by a particularized warrant and
plain view does not otherwise convert the search into a general warrant.55
However, plain view searches could not be used “to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges.” 56
In Coolidge, the Court also adopted an “inadvertence” requirement,
requiring that evidence seized under plain view be discovered accidentally
rather than intentionally. 57 Justice Black criticized the inadvertence rule in
his concurrence, 58 arguing that the “reasonableness” of a search should be
evaluated “under all the circumstances” rather than by affixing per se
rules. 59 Justice Black’s position on the inadvertence requirement would
ultimately be adopted by the Court in California v. Horton.60 Noting that
the discussion of “inadvertence” was limited to the plurality opinion, the
Court declined to apply it to the present case.61 Its two primary criticisms
concurring in result)); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S.
498 (1925). Coolidge is noteworthy for first establishing “plain view” as a distinct legal
doctrine. 403 U.S. at 443.
51
Id. at 445.
52
Id. at 465.
53
Id. at 467; see also WILLIAM CUDDIHY, FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 602–1791, at 569–74 (2009).
54
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
55
Id. at 467.
56
Id. at 466.
57
Id. at 469.
58
Id. at 506–07 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
59
Id. at 509–10.
60
496 U.S. 128 (1990). The case stemmed from the execution of a search warrant based
on probable cause of robbery and only authorizing a search of the defendant’s house for the
proceeds of that robbery. Instead the searching officer discovered weapons in plain view,
which were seized as evidence. Id. at 131.
61
Id. at 136–37.
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were: (1) that objective standards were preferable to standards that “depend
on the subjective state of mind of the officer” and, (2) because the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment was sufficient to protect
against the danger of general warrants, the additional protection of an
inadvertence requirement was unnecessary. 62
B. ARIZONA V. HICKS

In Arizona v. Hicks the Supreme Court clarified plain view doctrine by
requiring probable cause for plain view evidence to be seized.63 In that
case, officers entered an apartment without a warrant in response to a shot
fired from that apartment into the one below. 64 Upon entering the
apartment, they discovered an expensive stereo component that, given the
seemingly “squalid” condition of the apartment as a whole, fell under
immediate suspicion of being stolen. 65 An officer moved the stereo
component in order to view the serial number, which was used to confirm
that it was, in fact, stolen.66
The Court held that the moving of the stereo component constituted an
unreasonable search. 67 Even though the invasion of privacy was simply
moving a stereo component “a few inches,” the Court drew a bright line.68
Since the gun that the officers were authorized to search for could not have
been located in the area underneath the stereo component, the warrantless
search of the stereo was unreasonable.69 Even though the officer had a
reasonable suspicion to believe that the stereo was stolen, he lacked
probable cause and so was prohibited from “seizing” the turntable in order

62

Id. at 138–40.
480 U.S. 321 (1987). The requirement of probable cause has been explicitly left
unresolved in cases such as Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 n.7 (1983) (plurality). See
also Wallin, supra note 48, at 311–15 (discussing how the ambiguity of pre-Hicks caselaw
led to some lower courts adopting standards lower than probable cause).
64
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 323–34.
67
Id. at 328.
68
Id. at 325.
69
Id. at 325–26. The ruling also corrected an interpretation of Coolidge put forward by
the Arizona Court of Appeals. State v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The
Arizona court had held in Hicks that the search was unreasonable because the turntable was
unrelated to the shooting that justified the warrantless entry into the apartment. This implied
that even if the serial number had been on the top of the turntable and plainly visible, the
search would have been unreasonable. The Supreme Court directly rejected this
interpretation. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
63
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to view its serial number. 70 Since the officer only had a “reasonable
suspicion” that the stereo component was stolen, the Court held that
probable cause was lacking and an additional warrant would have been
required. 71
C. DIGITAL PLAIN VIEW 72

The Supreme Court’s treatment of plain view and plain view
analogues seems to be driven by a desire to prevent “fishing expeditions”
and dragnets, but to also create objective working rules for defining what a
“fishing expedition” is, rather than the simpler—but rightfully abandoned—
approach of asking whether or not the officer subjectively believed that he
was engaged in a fishing expedition. In physical cases, these fishing
expeditions can be detected by a sort of common sense reasoning. An
officer who detects contraband through “plain feel” while conducting a
legitimate Terry search is thus judged to be conducting a legitimate
search, 73 while an offer who boards a bus and squeezes soft-shell luggage
until contraband is discovered is not.74 The judge is supposed to look at the
surrounding context of the officer’s actions and judge its reasonableness.
One of the central problems raised by digital plain view is that this
common sense reasoning becomes more difficult to apply in a digital
context. Digital searches take place in an abstract space and the intentions
of officers conducting such a search can be difficult to objectively
determine, except in the most blatant cases. In Hicks, the shifting of the
stereo equipment, even though it was a minor act by the officer, clearly
raised a flag for the Court, since it was clear that the act was unrelated to
searching for a gun. By contrast, the actions of officers searching a
computer might not always be as easily reviewed by the courts for blatant
Fourth Amendment violations. This dynamic is concerning, since it makes
policing the execution of digital search warrants more difficult at the same
time as those warrants offer improved opportunities for fishing expeditions.

70

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 322, 326–27 (noting that the exceptions are for circumstances
where the seizure is “minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only
practicable means of detecting certain types of crime”).
71
Id. at 322, 326.
72
This Comment will use the term “digital plain view” to refer to any evidence
encountered while searching digital media that, while not responsive to the warrant
permitting the search, is nonetheless seizable in a manner similar to evidence encountered in
traditional plain view situations such as Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
73
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 370–71 (1993).
74
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000).
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But, in holding that the use of plain view in digital searches is per se
unconstitutional, the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision is
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. Allowing the use of
digital evidence discovered in plain view satisfies the first two purposes of
the warrant requirement, as defined in Coolidge. First, a digital plain view
claim does not waive the probable cause requirement any more than a
conventional plain view claim does.75 Indeed, maintaining the probable
cause requirement is essential to the approach advocated in this Comment,
since it provides a critical point of reference for judges seeking to
objectively assess the reasonableness of search warrants. 76 Second, a
properly particularized search warrant does not constitute a “general
warrant.” Typically, courts have not found that searches limited to a
particular place, in pursuit of a particular crime, and seeking sufficiently
particularized items constitute general warrants.77 Digital plain view,
despite the dangers, can be made to work if the courts are provided a new
way of objectively assessing whether the search being conducted is
reasonable, or simply an opportunistic fishing expedition.
IV. SEARCHES OF DIGITAL DATABASES
No court has attempted as detailed an approach to regulating digital
searches as the Ninth Circuit. The district courts have generally been free
to develop their own approaches, although they have generally been fairly
permissive of digital searches. Digital search problems have also attracted
the attention of many legal scholars whose proposals and solutions have
found their way into the reasoning of some courts. This section surveys
these approaches.

75

Cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326 (1987).
See infra Part V.
77
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (“[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not
that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s
belongings . . . . [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a particular
description of the things to be seized.”); United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]uthorization to search for ‘evidence of a crime,’ that is to say, any
crime, is so broad as to constitute a general warrant.”) (quoting United States v. George, 975
F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301
(1967) (noting that the general warrants permitted searches under “indiscriminate, general
authority” and that the Fourth Amendment ended general searches by requiring that the
warrant “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that a warrant whose terms authorized seizure of documents “pertaining to a
specific fraudulent transaction and a specific piece of real estate” did not constitute a general
warrant).
76
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A. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS

Both circuit and district courts have addressed the question of the
application of plain view to digital database searches. While there has been
some variation, most have permitted digital searches using plain view when
the data was incriminating and discovered while executing a particularized
warrant based on probable cause.
1. United States v. Carey: The File-Based Approach
In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a case in which
the police executed a search warrant for evidence of the sale and possession
of cocaine by the defendant. 78 Upon discovering computers on the
premises, the officers seized them and obtained an additional search warrant
to search the hard drives for “names, telephones, ledger receipts, addresses,
and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances.” 79 The police technician first attempted to search for
key words related to drug sales in “text-based” files. 80 When that failed, he
“explore[d]” the computer until he discovered a particular image file, which
he proceeded to open. 81 It contained child pornography. Rather than
obtaining a warrant expanding the scope of the search, the officer continued
opening files in that directory. 82 Many of those files contained additional
images of child pornography and were labeled with sexually suggestive
titles. 83
The court held that the search of image files beyond the first file was
unreasonable. 84 It noted that after opening the first file, the officer, by his
own admission, had probable cause to believe that the remaining files in the
directory also contained child pornography rather than evidence of drug
distribution. 85 Citing Tamura, it held that in computer searches, officers
must conduct an “intermediate step” and attempt to sort the digital files
such that intermingled non-pertinent files are removed prior to the search
beginning in earnest. 86 It also directed that magistrates “should” require the
officers to specify which types of files are sought. 87
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1271 & n.3.
Id. at 1276–77.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Id.
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This file-based approach to regulating digital searches has not found
much success as courts have become more aware of the ease with which it
can be circumvented. 88 The Tenth Circuit has already begun to walk away
from the Carey holding, noting in subsequent cases that it was a “limited”
and “fact-intense” holding 89 that “simply stands for the proposition that law
enforcement may not expand the scope of a search beyond its original
jurisdiction.” 90 Although the Tenth Circuit seems to be in the process of
marginalizing Carey, it remains influential in some circuit court decisions. 91
However, the acceptance is far from universal.
2. United States v. Mann: The Ambiguous Scrutiny Approach
Subsequent to the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision, the
Seventh Circuit has approved the use of digital plain view. 92 That case,
United States v. Mann, concerned the warranted seizure and search of a
hard drive that the police believed contained evidence related to the
defendant’s covert videotaping of a high school locker room. 93 Upon
searching the hard drive using specialized software, the police discovered
“many, many images of child pornography” as well as videos of the locker
room. 94 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the
88

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that
Carey seems to establish an inadvertence requirement which is difficult to reconcile with the
holding of Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)).
89
United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009).
90
United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006).
91
See infra note 111.
92
United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing CDT II, 579 F.3d 989
(9th Cir. 2009)). Although the Mann decision was released after Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., it only contains one passing reference to CDT II. Id. The Seventh Circuit had
previously addressed the question of plain view in dicta. United States v. Raney, 342 F.3d
551, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding search on grounds that the data seized was
particularized in the warrant, but alternatively permitted under plain view).
93
Mann, 592 F.3d at 780.
94
Id. at 781. Some of the child pornography had been discovered using a “hashing”
program, an automated program that can detect the presence of a particular file on a
computer hard drive if the exact digital contents of that file are already known to the
investigators. See Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the
Particularity Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2007); see also United States v.
Gabel, No. 10-60168, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107131, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2010)
(describing the national database of “child notable” image files, which investigators use to
program the automated hashing programs). The court ultimately suppressed the files
discovered by the hashing program, because it targeted known child pornography files, even
though the search was for files with unknown digital contents. Mann, 592 F.3d, at 784–85.
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. en banc decision also expressed concern, in dicta,
about the use of hashing programs. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 999. However, hashing programs
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police had exceeded the scope of their warrant and had effectively
conducted a prohibited general search. 95
The court upheld the search, noting that the software used by the
officer served primarily to collect image files, including disguised files, and
display them. 96 The court noted that the warrant directed the police to
search “places likely to contain ‘images of women in locker rooms and
other private places,’” and that such an image file could be hidden virtually
anywhere within the computer. 97 Since the program was used in a
“systematic” way to search the computer, the discovery and seizure of child
pornography was reasonable. 98 The court specifically declined to adopt the
holding of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., instead adopting Judge
Callahan’s criticism that the abolition of digital plain view was an “efficient
but overbroad approach.” 99 The court counseled that magistrates “exercise
caution to ensure” that digital search warrants meet the particularity
requirement and are narrowly tailored.100 It is difficult to know what this
“narrowly tailored” requirement consists of, since the court approvingly
cited United States v. Gray. 101 In that case, digital plain view was held to
justify the discovery of child pornography during a file-by-file search of a
computer due to the fact that the search was done systematically and
raise interesting questions in light of Supreme Court precedents, such as United States v.
Jacobsen, in which the Court upheld a government chemical test for the presence of cocaine
in a pile of white powder that fell out of an in-transit delivery package. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
The warrantless search was upheld because it could disclose no “private facts,” only the
presence of cocaine. Id. at 123 (“A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a
particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”).
What limits therefore should be placed on hashing programs, even if they are undeniably
used to conduct warrantless fishing expeditions? See United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d
1045, 1048 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that using hashing software to “vacuum[] vast
quantities of [internet] data indiscriminately” may result in a Fourth Amendment violation,
but upholding its use to detect child pornography shared using peer-to-peer software); United
States v. Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (invalidating hash program
search on grounds that the search was directed towards child pornography, but the officers
lacked a warrant and had only been given consent by owner to search for evidence of “illegal
credit card use”). For a broader discussion of the “private facts” model discussed in
Jacobsen, see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 512 (2007); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 387–90 (2002) (criticizing the
Jacobsen decision’s rationale).
95
Mann, 592 F.3d at 782.
96
Id. at 785–86.
97
Id. at 782.
98
Id. at 786.
99
Id. at 785.
100
Id. at 786.
101
Id. at 784.
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regardless of file name. 102 Thus, the court’s directive to narrowly tailor
searches clearly still allows law enforcement to conduct searches of entire
hard drives, while adopting Carey-like requirement of a systematic search.
3. United States v. Williams: The Status Quo Approach
The facts of United States v. Williams resembled those of Mann,
although Williams stemmed from an investigation into threatening e-mails
sent to a church rather than voyeurism. 103 The police obtained a broad
warrant, authorizing the seizure of “[a]ny and all computer systems and
digital storage media, videotapes, videotape recorders, documents,
photographs, and Instrumentalities indicat[ive] of [criminal e-mail
harassment].” 104 Searches of these media uncovered child pornography,
some of it placed in files mislabeled “Virus Shield Quaranteed [sic] Files,
Destroy.” 105
The Fourth Circuit upheld the application of plain view, applying a
more permissive approach to digital searches than the Seventh Circuit. In a
sort of preamble, the court announced its expectation that digital searches
and seizures would soon develop a “set of rules . . . that attempts to achieve
the same purpose [as the rules for physical searches] in a very different
factual context.” 106 However, the court rejected the specific argument
presented, which was that the immense amount of data stored on computers
created a heightened expectation of privacy, requiring specialized
requirements for searches under the Fourth Amendment. 107 The court
refused to treat digital databases in a manner different than a file cabinet
containing a large number of documents. 108
Although the court recognized the “grave dangers inherent in
executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s
papers,” 109 it noted that these concerns simply “counsel[] care and respect
for privacy when executing a warrant” and do not prevent lawful searches

102

Id. (citing United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding
the opening of a file labeled “tiny teen” by an officer searching for evidence of computer
hacking because officer opened the file only after opening every file listed previous to it in
the file directory)).
103
592 F.3d 511, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2010). The threats to the church made mention of a
desire to molest young boys who attended the church. Id.
104
Id. at 515.
105
Id. at 516.
106
Id. at 515.
107
Id. at 518.
108
Id. at 523.
109
Id. (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976)).
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of computer files. 110 Because the court accepted the logic that files may be
mislabeled, as the files were in this case, the file-by-file search conducted
met the requirements of plain view once the “immediately apparent” child
pornography came into view. 111 Since the search complied with the basic
requirements for searches of physical documents, the court ultimately
Despite being decided several months after
upheld the search. 112
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the decision did not mention the case,
although it did cite to a prior Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Giberson, which similarly held that for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, digital storage media are not significantly different than other
closed containers. 113
B. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS

The district courts have been addressing issues raised by plain view
digital searches for over a decade.114 As one might expect, they have
adopted a range of approaches. For example, in United States v. Fumo, a
case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court adopted a pro-search
approach to digital records, noting that “because of the nature of computer
files, the government may legally open and briefly examine the nature of
each file when searching a computer pursuant to a valid warrant.” 115
Like the Fourth Circuit, the district courts have generally rejected the
position that, by their nature, digital records must be protected in a different

110

Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 522–23.
112
Id. at 524.
113
Id. (citing United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008)). The court cited
Giberson in support of its treatment of computers as a container. Id.
114
See generally United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United
States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690 (D. Me. Sep. 29, 2009); United
States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Crespo-Rios, 623 F.
Supp. 2d 198 (D.P.R. 2009); United States v. Mann, No. 2:07-CR-197, 2008 WL 1701743,
(N.D. Ind. April 8, 2008); United States v. Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa.
2008); United States v. Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2008); United States v. Sage,
Crim. Act. No. 07-00006-01-CR-W-SOW, 2007 LEXIS 99110 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2007);
United States v. Kearns, No. 1:05-CR-146-WSD-JMF, 2006 WL 2668544 (N.D. Ga. Feb.
21, 2006); United States v. Kaechele, 466 F. Supp. 2d 868 (E.D. Mich. 2006); United States
v. Welch, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Kan. 2005); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081
(C.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004); In re
Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961–62 (N.D. Ill. 2004); United States v.
Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002); United States v. Gray, 78 F.
Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998).
115
Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
111
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manner than physical records. 116 The decisions tend to reject arguments
claiming overbroad searches 117 or unparticularized warrants.118 While at
least one court has experimented with requiring the government to provide
search protocols, 119 only a few cases have analyzed the case using the
Carey file-based framework 120 and many have distinguished or rejected
it. 121
One case addressing the issue of search methodology is United States
v. Hill. 122 The case is of particular note as it was decided by Judge
Kozinski, sitting by designation as a district court judge, five years prior to
authoring the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision. The case, like
many digital search cases, involved a suppression motion filed by a
defendant in a child pornography possession case. The suppression motion
argued, in part, that the search warrant granted to the police for digital
storage media was overbroad because it failed to define a search
methodology based on file names or types. Judge Kozinski rejected this
argument, noting that “images can be hidden in all manner of files, even
116
See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2007) (“At bottom . . . there is neither a heightened nor a reduced level of
protection for information stored on computers, as there is no justification for favoring those
who are capable of storing their records on computer over those who keep hard copies of
their records.”); accord Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 584; Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
117
See United States v. Jack, No. CR.S-07-0266 FCD, 2009 WL 453051, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (providing a list of district and circuit court cases rejecting or
discounting these overbreadth arguments). But see Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 964
(suppressing image files in “plain view” during a consented to search when the search would
only require searching text or internet-based files).
118
See Sage, 2007 LEXIS 99110 at *18; Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690 at *5. But see Mink
v. Knox, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14684 (10th Cir. July 19, 2010) (rejecting search warrant
on particularity grounds, since the warrant failed to specify the crime that investigators were
to search the computer for evidence of).
119
See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (requiring “as a
practical matter” that the Government provide magistrates with search protocols when
searching intermingled digital documents in order to satisfy the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL
670930, *4 (D. Utah Apr. 13, 2001) (holding that methods or criteria by which a search of
computer files would be conducted “should have been presented to [a] . . . magistrate before
the issuance of the warrants or to support the issuance of a second, more specific warrant
once intermingled documents were discovered”).
120
See Mann v. United States, 592 F.3d 779, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2010); Richardson, 583 F.
Supp. 2d at 716.
121
United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 948 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Jack, 2009 WL
453051, at *4; United States v. Kearns, No. 1:05-CR-146-WSD-JMF, 2006 WL 2668544, at
*7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006); United States v. Welch, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D. Kan.
2005); Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
122
332 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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word processing documents and spreadsheets. Criminals will do all they
can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient of changing the
names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual
observer.” 123 Ultimately, the search was upheld.124
The district courts have been weighing the reasonableness of digital
plain view for some time, experimenting with different methods for
evaluating the reasonableness of search warrant applications based on their
knowledge of existing technology and circuit court methods. Although
their results have produced variation, their collective experience indicates
that they could cope with a more flexible approach to reviewing digital
search applications than the one advocated in Comprehensive Drug Testing,
Inc.
C. SCHOLARLY WRITING

Digital searches have attracted the attention of legal scholars for well
over a decade. Published articles have advocated a variety of positions,
from abolition of plain view to unfettered continuation. 125 The articles have
123

Id. at 1090.
Id. Judge Kozinski’s decision in United States v. Hill is very difficult to reconcile
with his stance in Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. One difference (among others) was
that Hill concerned the privacy of a child pornography possessor, while Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc. threatened the privacy rights of professional baseball players, a
considerably less despised group. At least one commentator has noted the danger posed by
the fact most digital search cases result from child pornography prosecutions. RayMing
Chang, Note, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evidence, 12
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 61 (2007). In theory, this may lead courts to adopt
more permissive search standards than they would otherwise. Id. This is roughly analogous
to the weakening of the Fourth Amendment caused by the War on Drugs, due to the relative
unpopularity of the defendants in those cases. See Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot
Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment Survive the Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L.
REV. 631 (2004).
125
See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and
Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193 (2005) (arguing that computers are
not sufficiently different from conventional document containers to require new protocols);
Jekot, supra note 94 (exploring alternatives, but not advocating any particular one); Orin
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005) (arguing for
abolition of digital plain view on pragmatic grounds); Raphael Winick, Searches and
Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994) (arguing for
search restrictions based on file formats); Chang, supra note 124 (arguing for abolition of
plain view in digital searches); David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the
Execution of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
841 (2005) (arguing that traditional document search rules should apply to digital searches);
Recent Case, supra note 40 (arguing that plain view should be applicable to digital
documents, but only when the particular file containing the incriminating data was
responsive to the warrant). Although digital searches have attracted significant scholarly
124
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had some influence on the courts. In its Carey decision, the Tenth Circuit
cited a Harvard Journal of Law & Technology article by Professor Raphael
Winick in support of its file-format based search parameter. 126 Professor
Winick recommended that the Tamura procedure be extended into digital
searches in order to preserve the particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 127 The article argued that analogizing computers to physical
“containers” and applying “container” precedents was inappropriate to
address the Fourth Amendment concerns raised by digital searches. 128
Finally, the article suggested that the government must face a heavy burden
in demonstrating probable cause of deception when seeking to conduct a
search that does not rely on file names and formats. 129
Although Professor Winick’s article did not specifically address plain
view in the context of digital searches, later articles called for its abolition.
Many of them also strongly disagreed with Carey and Professor Winick. 130
Those advocating for the abolition of the plain view doctrine based their
arguments on several grounds. One argument is that digital plain view, due
to its incentivizing of invasive and aimless searches, constitutes a de facto
authorization of constitutionally impermissible “general warrants.”131 This
school of thought regards computers as a special and unique situation,
comparable to a “tape recorder . . . that’s recording our every thought and
every word.” 132
Professor Orin Kerr has also argued for the abolition of plain view in
digital searches, on the ground that this is a more pragmatic approach. 133
He argues that abolishing plain view is not only the least complicated
approach to rethinking the plain view doctrine, it is also the most
attention, this Comment is the first to advocate a flexible process of search warrant
negotiations centered around creating a balance between the privacy costs of the search and
the societal interests in punishing a particular crime. See infra Part V.
126
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Winick, supra
note 125).
127
Winick, supra note 125, at 108–09 (“A vague allegation that the nature of computer
storage somehow requires a full text review of all files in all situations should not be
permitted to eviscerate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.”).
128
Id. at 110.
129
Id. at 108.
130
See, e.g., Chang, supra note 124, at 50 (calling the Carey format-based approach to
warrant restriction “illusory”); Ziff, supra note 125, at 853 (“The Carey-Winick approach
fails to apply the plain view doctrine to searches of computer files and incorrectly relies on
the subjective intent of the searching officer to determine the constitutional limits on the
scope of a computer search.”).
131
Chang, supra note 124, at 66.
132
Id. at 67 (internal quotes omitted).
133
Kerr, supra note 125, at 534.
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balanced. 134 In the process of removing their ability to claim plain view
justifications, it frees law enforcement officers to conduct computer
searches in whatever manner they find to be the most efficient way to
discover the files particularized in the warrant.135 Professor Kerr does
however admit that this is an “imperfect” approach.136
Other articles advocate for continued application of plain view to
digital searches. An excellent student note by J.S. Ziff calls for an alternate
approach to that recommended by the Carey-Winick approach.137 Ziff
argues that the existing limitations of plain view doctrine are sufficient to
maintain Fourth Amendment rights in a digital age. Those rights, as
defined in Horton are: (1) that the officer lawfully be in a position from
which to view the object seized in plain view, (2) that the object’s
incriminating character be immediately apparent, and (3) that the officer
have a lawful right of access to the object itself.138 Of these requirements,
Ziff believes the “immediately apparent” requirement is especially
restrictive, since it requires that the government prove it had probable cause
to believe that the evidence found in plain view was contraband or evidence
of a crime. 139 For these reasons, Ziff concludes that the plain view doctrine
can be fairly applied to digital searches.
Thus, the scholarly approaches seem to gravitate toward extremes,
calling either for the outright abolition of digital plain view or its
unmodified preservation. To some degree, this is because there is no
obvious middle ground; either immediately incriminating evidence not
described in a search warrant is admissible, or it is not. However, this
failure to create a middle ground results in a failure to produce an optimal
approach to balancing privacy with the social need for effective criminal
investigations. This Comment argues that such a middle ground exists, as
described below.
V. REBALANCING COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ultimately is an overreaction
sparked by the concern that the government has found a major loophole

134

Id.
Id. at 583–84.
136
Id.
137
Ziff, supra note 125; see also Clancy, supra note 125, at 195 (arguing that digital
media should be treated in the same manner as physical containers, such as filing cabinets).
138
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990).
139
Ziff, supra note 125, at 866.
135
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with respect to digital plain view. 140 The en banc panel was concerned that
by combining the plain view doctrine with the seemingly arbitrary nature of
a digital search, the government will be able to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on general searches. 141 However, in creating a
judicially-imposed process applicable to all “normal[]” digital search cases,
regardless of individual circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has constructed an
inefficient solution to a problem that demands a careful approach.142
Further, by overextending Fourth Amendment protections in this area, the
Ninth Circuit risks providing itself, or other courts, with an excuse for not
extending them far enough in more deserving locations. 143
Rather than affixing per se rules, the most adaptable and efficient
approach to protecting Fourth Amendment rights in an era of digital
searches is to focus, on a case-by-case basis, on the reasonableness of the
search. 144 Magistrate judges should deny search warrants which will cause
unreasonable harm to legitimate privacy interests, in light of the severity of
the crime being investigated and the strength of the probable cause shown.
In turn, the government can re-apply and offer search procedures calculated
to decrease the privacy costs of their search (as determined by the
magistrate). This will help ensure that the social harm caused by
government intrusions can be minimized, while allowing the government to
narrowly tailor its searches in a manner that minimizes inefficiency. 145
140
See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The sequence of events supports the
suspicion that representations in the warrant about the necessity for broad authority to seize
materials were designed to give the government access to the full list of professional baseball
players and their confidential drug testing records.”).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1000. This Comment does not argue that the en banc decision to dismiss the
Government’s appeal of the “Mahan Order” as untimely was incorrect. Nor does it take
issue with the fifth holding of the case, related to return of documents, which seems to reflect
the existing interpretation of Fed R. Crim. Pro. 41(g) and addresses concerns regarding
government stockpiling of private information. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 166–67 (2004).
143
Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 116–17 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
absolutist approach to protecting houses under the Fourth Amendment has been used as a
justification for denial of Fourth Amendment protections in other contexts).
144
Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509–10 (1970) (Black, J., concurring)
(“The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its
own facts.”); see also United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (“As always under
the Fourth Amendment, the standard is reasonableness.”).
145
Alexander A. Reinert notes that often the Court often views privacy costs as those
borne by the individual, even though there is a general “collective value” in limiting the
number and intrusiveness of government searches. Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s)
and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 104 ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1464–65 (2010). This
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Furthermore, it is important to remember that, if digital searches are
properly monitored and subjected to scrutiny during trial, the digital plain
view approach is actually of limited use to the government. This makes the
development of extraordinary procedures to limit its abuse unnecessary.
A. REASONABLE DIGITAL SEARCHES

In order to obtain a search warrant, the government must demonstrate
probable cause to justify their search.146 Probable cause is an ambiguous
phrase, and, historically, the Supreme Court’s treatment of it has been
somewhat inconsistent. The Court has offered different explanations of
what constitutes probable cause throughout its history. 147 It remains unclear
whether or not probable cause even means that a certain suspicion must be
more likely than not to be valid. 148 Professor Craig Lerner, among others,
has raised the question of whether probable cause is, in fact, not a fixed
probability, but is rather variable, depending on the overall
“reasonableness” of a particular search requested by the government. 149
Professor Lerner explains that “reasonableness” can be explained in a
Comment similarly refers to such costs as “social costs” rather than purely individual ones,
although individual costs can typically be calculated in a more direct and intuitive manner
than broader social costs.
146
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (stating
that “the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the
term ‘probable cause’”).
147
Compare United States v. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.)
(“[Probable cause] imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”),
with United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924) (Taft, C.J.) (defining probable cause
as a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt”), and United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160,
175 (1949) (noting that probable cause requires “less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction” but “more than mere suspicion”), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983). See generally Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 951, 979–90 (2003) (providing a history of the Supreme Court’s attempts to define
probable cause).
148
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e) (4th ed. 2004) (reviewing a
trio of modern Supreme Court cases and concluding that they do not expressly answer the
question of whether probable cause means more-probable-than-not); see also Lerner, supra
note 147, at 996 (“[T]he Court’s statement that probable cause is more than a suspicion and
less than beyond a reasonable doubt places it somewhere between .01% and 90%, which,
when all is said and done, is not all that helpful.”).
149
Lerner, supra note 147, at 951 (“The reality experienced by American citizens today
is that they are searched and seized on a regular basis, and for the vast majority of these
searches (e.g., airport searches, street stops, DUI checkpoints, urine testing of government
employees), the constitutionality seems to turn not on probable cause, but on the
reasonableness of the search, factoring in the degree of the intrusion and the gravity of the
investigated offense.”); see also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A
Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 474 (1984).
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search and seizure context using a modified version of the Hand Formula—
a tool famous for estimating “reasonableness” in the context of
negligence. 150
The Hand Formula, as displayed below, seeks to optimize the balance
between preventing unintentional harms and the expenses of such
precautions: 151
B<PxL

Negligence can be inferred when the costs of taking action to prevent
an accident (B) are less than the product of the costs of the harm caused by
the accident (L) and the probability of the accident occurring (P).
Similarly, Professor Lerner creates a version modified for use in
evaluating the reasonableness of searches under the Fourth Amendment: 152
C<VxP

Here, a search is reasonable if the costs of the privacy invasion (C) are
less than the product of the social benefit of obtaining evidence of a
particular crime (V) and the probability of such evidence being found in a
particular place (P). 153 Professor Lerner provides an example of how this
might work:
[A]ssume that there is a twenty percent chance that police will uncover evidence of
tax fraud among a suspect’s personal papers in his home. The social benefit of a
conviction is $100,000, and the privacy intrusion associated with a search of one’s
personal papers is $50,000. The expected benefit or value of a search would be
$20,000 ($100,000 x .2), which is less than the expected cost of $40,000 ($50,000 x
.8). Thus, the search would be unreasonable in these circumstances. 154

Admittedly, assigning specific values to the variables is somewhat
arbitrary and, despite the use of formulae, subjective. 155 This is a simple
reality of many multi-factor balancing tests. The value of this approach is
150

Lerner, supra note 147, at 1019–20 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)).
151
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (5th ed. 1998).
152
Lerner, supra note 147, at 1019–20. This formula is hereinafter referred to as the
“Lerner Formula.”
153
Id. Professor Lerner presents an additional formula: P x V > (1-P) x C, in an attempt
to incorporate Supreme Court holdings stating that no invasion of privacy occurs when the
government seizes contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
He further modifies the formula to incorporate a “privacy multiplier” called m to reflect the
fact that the harm caused by a search may vary depending on context. This produces the
formula: P x V > (1-P) x (C x m). For the sake of simplicity, this Comment focuses on the
first iteration of the formula.
154
Lerner, supra note 147, at 1020.
155
Id.
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primarily heuristic, and its role is not to ensure perfect cost-benefit analysis
of search warrant applications, but to ensure that magistrate judges consider
both the costs of invasions of privacy and the social costs of undeterred
crime when determining whether or not a search is reasonable.
Furthermore, by having a simple and understandable framework, they can
more easily coordinate their efforts with other magistrates and can more
easily incorporate guidance from their appellate courts.156
Although this approach has faced criticism, 157 this balancing of
privacy and social interests can be found in existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 158 For instance, in Winston v. Lee, the Supreme Court
reviewed a restraining order brought by an armed robbery suspect to
prevent the Commonwealth of Virginia from removing a bullet from the
deep muscle tissue of his chest. 159 The police believed the bullet would
prove that the man had been shot while attempting to rob a store.160 The
operation to remove the bullet would require the use of a general anesthetic
156
See Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search
Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 477 (2007)
(arguing for a quantitative “economically-informed” approach to assessing the reasonable
expectations of privacy regarding novel technologies instead of the more indeterminate
“moral” approach to privacy). Cf. Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393
(1978) (assessing the value of privacy in the context of torts in commercial and personal
contexts).
157
See LAFAVE, supra note 148, at § 3.2(a) (“The problem with the balancing
approach . . . is that it converts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot. The
varieties of police behavior and of the occasions that call it forth are so innumerable that
their reflection in a general sliding scale approach could only produce more slide than
scale.”); Kit Kinports, Commentary: Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches,
6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 655 (2009) (disputing Professor Lerner’s interpretation of case
law).
158
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting) (“[I]f we
are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me
they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.”); see also Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“[I]n determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (“Determining
whether an expectation of privacy is “legitimate” or “reasonable” necessarily entails a
balancing of interests.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 21–22 (1968) (applying a balancing
test to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s “pat-down” search); Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (“Unfortunately, there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.”). But see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208
(1979) (rejecting the notion that privacy and governmental interests must be balanced on a
case-by-case basis).
159
470 U.S. 753, 757 (1985).
160
Id. at 755–56. The suspect claimed that he had been shot while being mugged. Id. at
756.
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and could have taken anywhere between twenty minutes and two-and-a-half
hours to complete. 161 As with any surgery, the procedure carried risks of
complications, infection, or over-anesthetization. 162
The Court held that the reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath
the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in “which the individual’s
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in
conducting the procedure.” 163 The Court found that the surgical procedure,
although justified by probable cause, constituted an extreme intrusion into
the bodily integrity and personal privacy of the suspect.164 It noted that
such a serious intrusion easily outbalanced the Commonwealth’s need to
retrieve the bullet, since other evidence could be used to establish the
connection between the suspect and the robbery (such as identification by
the storekeeper who shot him, and the fact that the suspect was found eight
blocks away from the store only twenty minutes after the robbery.) 165 The
Court contrasted the circumstances of compelled surgery against the
security of “houses, papers, and effects.” 166
Winston clearly demonstrates a process of balancing in reviewing
police actions for compliance with the Fourth Amendment. The case would
have clearly been resolved differently if the bullet had been lodged in the
defendant’s shoe instead of his chest. The Court hints that the case may
have been decided in a different manner if the bullet had been essential to
the case, rather than relatively disposable. The case also shows, not only
that the amount of probable cause necessary to justify warrants varies
depending on the circumstances, but that sometimes even a high degree of
probable cause cannot justify an unnecessary search with high privacy
costs. Winston reflects an effective illustration of why flexibility, rather
than per se rules, can sometimes be the only way to maintain Fourth
Amendment protections in novel situations, such as digital searches.

161

Id. at 764.
Id. In its earlier decision, the court of appeals deemed these risks “minimal”. Id. at
764 n.7. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the actual risks of harm were
“apparently not severe” but were at least “a subject of considerable dispute” and
“uncertain[].” Id. at 766.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 765.
165
Id. at 756, 765 (noting that the suspect was identified by the storekeeper who had shot
him, and the suspect had been found shot eight blocks away from the store only twenty
minutes after the storekeeper shot the man robbing him).
166
Id. at 759 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
162
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B. APPLYING THE LERNER FORMULA TO DIGITAL SEARCHES

The Lerner Formula presents an adaptable and practical approach for
reconciling the need for digital searches with the Fourth Amendment and
rising expectations of privacy in digital storage media. The privacy costs of
a file-by-file digital search vary by computer, but it can generally be
assumed to be fairly high. The privacy costs of searching a computer used
almost exclusively for criminal purposes are probably low, because the files
particularized in the warrant are intermingled with a relatively small
number of non-particularized files. However, most computers targeted for
search are personal computers. 167 Personal computers play an increasingly
central role in modern life and they often contain correspondence, personal
records, medical information, and other forms of private information.168 A
file-by-file search of these records would carry serious privacy costs,
although perhaps less severe than the privacy costs of the compelled
surgery at issue in Winston. 169 If a computer is owned or shared by people
who are not under suspicion, the privacy costs would typically increase
further. 170
However, these privacy costs will not always outweigh society’s need
to investigate crimes. Searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects”
can be justified when the public need for evidence rises to a sufficient
level. 171 Courts regularly permit searches of homes and personal records, 172
despite the high privacy expected in those areas.173
Furthermore, digital searches create less of a practical intrusion than
searches of intermingled paper documents, like the search in Tamura. 174
167

See generally cases summarized supra Part IV.
Kerr, supra note 125, at 532.
169
Winston, 470 U.S. at 753.
170
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2001).
171
Winston, 470 U.S. at 759.
172
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–25 (4th Cir. 2010) (permitting
plain view discovery of gun in locked case during search of any container within a suspect’s
house large enough to contain a data storage device); United States v. Reyerson, No. 3:09CR-66, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21237, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2010) (upholding removal
of cabinet during search of mobile home for drugs).
173
See U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“At the risk of belaboring the obvious,
private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant . . . .”); see also Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it important that this is not an area
immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.”).
174
In fact, the Tamura decision cites a prior decision in which investigators were allowed
to conduct an intermingled documents search without the supervision of a neutral magistrate
when their search could be conducted on-site and would not require a seizure. United States
v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 n.4 (citing Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045,
168
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Large-scale document seizures have heightened privacy costs, because they
deprive the owners of those documents the ability to access them while the
search is conducted and require the prolonged presence of government
agents on the owner’s property. 175 By contrast, when conducting a digital
search, government agents can, upon a showing of necessity to the
magistrate, create a “bitstream copy” of the records.176 A bitstream copy is
an exact reproduction of a digital record, and includes all data within the
record, including hidden or even “deleted” files. 177 The target of the
warrant is able to keep their records, while the government is then able to
execute the search warrant without causing undue interference. Thus, the
limited practical intrusion of digital searches may play an important role in
a magistrate’s calculation of privacy costs in some cases.
When applying the Lerner Formula, magistrates must also weigh the
public necessity of conducting a particular digital search. One factor of
central importance is the social cost of the crime being investigated, which
will vary by case. 178 However, magistrates should also take into account
1053–54 (9th Cir. 1982) and distinguishing the case as involving a search, rather than a
seizure).
175
For a particularly egregious example, see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States
Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432, 437 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (owner of electronic bulletin board
had computers and disks seized; court found no valid reason why information sought could
not be copied and equipment returned within hours), aff’d 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
176
United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“At the very least, the
government should copy and return the equipment as soon as possible.”).
177
Kerr, supra note 125, at 541. A bitstream copy may contain deleted files because
most computer hard drives, when directed to delete information, do not actually wipe the
sectors of the hard drive containing that information clean. Rather, they mark those sectors
as a suitable location to overwrite with new data. However, until that new data arrives, the
“deleted” data remains in that location. See Craig Ball, Computer Forensics for Lawyers
Who Can’t Set the Clock on Their VCR, in 6 ON FORENSICS 29–30 (2005), available at
http://www.craigball.com/cf_vcr.pdf.
178
Professor Lerner’s article recognizes that varying probable cause requirements
depending on the severity of the crime alleged is a “minority view” suggested by Justice
Jackson’s dissent in United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160, 180–82 (1949) and Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967). Lerner, supra note 147, at
1015–19. Justice Jackson’s view has found some support from leading jurists, including
Judge Friendly and Judge Posner. See United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J. dissenting) (“If [the] decision were mine to make, I would not be at all
averse to straightforward recognition that the gravity of the suspected crime and the utility of
the police action . . . are factors bearing on the validity of the search or arrest decision.”);
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Posner, J.) (“The amount
of information that prudent police will collect before deciding to make a search or an arrest,
and hence the amount of probable cause they will have, is a function of the gravity of the
crime, and especially the danger of its imminent repetition.”). Ultimately the question of
whether or not it is appropriate to consider the severity of the alleged crime is a subject of
considerable debate. See Kerr, supra note 125, at 581 (describing the practice of varying
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the general need for the government to effectively detect and investigate
crime in a digital age. The increased availability of computing power and
telecommunications has created new forms of crime and has made many
existing crimes easier to commit. 179 It also makes evidence of crime more
difficult to detect or investigate due to the likelihood of mislabeling, 180 or
disguise, 181 the exponentially increasing size of databases,182 and the
widespread availability of encryption technology. 183 Digital crime also
permissible search procedures based on severity of offense “problematic”); Eugene Volokh,
Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1983 (2004) (“We
may all agree that there is a difference between murder and littering, but it doesn't follow
that courts can create administrable lines that distinguish the various cases between the two
extremes.”). But see Jeffrey Bellin, Crime Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World 38–41 (S. Methodist Univ., Working
Paper
No.
64,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1692312 (arguing that considering crime severity may help limit the potential
for new technologies to allow for particularly intrusive searches). Ultimately, this question
is not a focus of this Comment, which instead will focus on the public interest in conducting
efficient digital investigations regardless of the crime investigated.
179
See Robin Bryant, The Challenge of Digital Crime, in INVESTIGATING DIGITAL CRIME
1–11 (Robin Bryant, ed. 2008) (listing the inherent advantages of digital crimes, including
spatial and temporal benefits, economies of scale, anonymity, “legislative lag,” and
improved concealment); see also James J. Tomkovicz, The Effect of Technology on Fourth
Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 319 n.5 (2002) (collecting
examples of computer crimes). See generally Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement, Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew Lourie, Acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen. and Chief of Staff Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
180
See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (“[I]t is precisely because computer files can be intermingled and
encrypted that the computer is a useful criminal tool.”). See generally Ross E. Mayfield,
Investigative Strategy and Utilities, in FORENSIC COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION 105
(Thomas A. Johnson, ed., 2006).
181
See Whitson Gordon, Hide Secret Files in Office 2007 Documents, LIFEHACKER (May
13, 2010), http://lifehacker.com/5538370/hide-secret-files-in-office-2007-documents.
182
See Ziff, supra note 125, at 860–61 (noting the exponential growth of digital
databases and the increasing impracticality of the approaches advocated in United States v.
Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) and Winick, supra note 125); see also PETER
GRABOWSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 70 (2d ed., 2007) (“[T]he metaphor of the needle in the
haystack is not entirely inappropriate. Even with automated search tools, finding that needle
may be extremely difficult and time-consuming.”).
183
See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (S.D. Tex 2009) (noting that
investigators required two months to decode encrypted files); EOGAN CASEY, DIGITAL
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET 498
(2d ed. 2004) (describing investigator difficulty in detecting activities of online child
pornography distribution ring due to encryption). In some cases, the very act of shutting
down and seizing computer hardware can result in the permanent loss of encrypted data.
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATIVE USES OF TECHNOLOGY: DEVICES, TOOLS, AND
TECHNIQUES 51 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213030.pdf.
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creates a sense of distance and anonymity that may encourage those likely
to be deterred from committing conventional crimes to commit digital
ones. 184 Society has an interest in detecting both digital crimes and
traditional crimes that now create digital evidence. If courts fail to take
these interests into account, they risk making an already complicated and
difficult form of investigation even more so.
Ultimately, the greatest advantage of establishing this system of
balances is the efficient negotiation that can be encouraged by magistrates.
If a magistrate rejects a search warrant application after finding that it
carries an unduly high privacy cost, then an investigator responding to this
decision must attempt to change the variables in the Lerner formula if she
still wants to obtain a search warrant. However, she typically cannot
change the magistrate’s assessment of the search’s social costs. And while
improving the probability variable is possible in some cases, this will be
impossible in many cases, especially if the investigation requires a digital
search to proceed any further. Therefore, the investigator will most often be
forced to offer compromises in order to reduce the privacy costs.
These compromises will produce much more efficient results than the
judicially-imposed processes contemplated in Comprehensive Drug Testing,
Inc. Investigators will have their choice of what concessions to offer, and
can suggest compromises that minimize impairment of the investigation
while offering a sufficient reduction in privacy cost to obtain the approval
of the magistrate. For instance, in some cases investigators may have
enough information about the target computer and the targeted files to
develop a search protocol designed to minimize the amount of nonpertinent material that comes into view. In other cases, investigators may
know little about the file systems of the target system and may have reason

Additionally, federal officials recently discovered a Russian spy ring that communicated, in
part, by using commonly-available steganography programs to hide communications in
innocuous-looking image files. Stuart Fox, How Russian Spies Hid Secret Codes in Online
Photos, CSMONITOR.COM (June 30, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2010/0630/
How-Russian-spies-hid-secret-codes-in-online-photos. The investigators discovered the
hidden messages, not through sophisticated electronic surveillance, but by searching the
homes of the spies and finding the password necessary to decrypt the messages written on a
piece of paper next to a computer. Noah Shachtman, FBI: Spies Hid Secret Messages on
Public Websites, WIRED (June 29, 2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/
alleged-spies-hid-secret-messages-on-public-websites.
184
See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such A Thing As “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM.
LAW REV. 1, ¶125; Monique Mattei Ferraro & Joseph Sudol, Internet Crimes Against
Children, in FORENSIC COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION 129, 131 (Thomas A. Johnson ed.,
2006).
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to believe that the computer’s owner has mislabeled or disguised files. 185
Under these circumstances, rather than offering a search protocol to the
magistrate, the investigators may suggest other concessions. 186
The en banc Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision helpfully
suggests what kinds of concessions they could make. They could waive
plain view for all documents that are not responsive to the warrant,187 or
simply waive it entirely. 188 They could have the search conducted by
technicians under the supervision of a magistrate.189 In circumstances
where the digital databases belong to a third party not suspected of
wrongdoing, the government could agree to conduct their search in
collaboration with the database owner. 190 If the contents of the file being
searched for are already known, which can occur in some cases, the

185

Michael G. Noblett, Mark M. Pollitt, & Lawrence A. Presley, Recovering and
Examining Computer Forensic Evidence, 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE COMM. 7 (2000), available at
www.fbi.gov/hp/lab/fsc/backissue/oct2000/computer.htm (observing that there is “no such
thing as generic computer science procedures” and that “evidence is likely to be significantly
different every time a submission is received by the laboratory and will likely require an
examination plan tailored to that particular evidence”).
186
This process of negotiation renders unnecessary the third holding of Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., which required “disclos[ure of the] actual risks of destruction of
information.” See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009). Demanding that agents
determine “actual risks of destruction,” is a requirement that is as daunting to agents as it is
difficult for magistrates to enforce. The negotiation process is a more effective way of
ensuring that agents develop honest estimates of risk of destruction or disguise. Agents must
develop fair estimates of these risks, otherwise they will offer search concessions that make
their search unnecessarily difficult.
187
Recent Case, supra note 40, at 1009–10 (dubbing this the “responsive document
approach”).
188
CDT II, 579 F.3d at 997–98, 1006. The degree to which waiver of plain view actually
reduces privacy costs is something of an open question. The knowledge that investigators
may not use digital evidence against a target if that evidence was discovered while searching
for evidence of an unrelated crime may decrease privacy concerns to an extent. Nonetheless,
they do not reduce the costs entirely, since the private files will still be viewed by
government agents (or, under the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. approach, government
technicians and possibly a supervising magistrate.) The complex nature of privacy
complicates these determinations about when privacy rights have been impaired and to what
degree they have been impaired. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477 (2006) (categorizing modern privacy interests in four groups: information
collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion).
189
CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000–01, 1006.
190
CDT offered some limited assistance to the government in determining where the
records of the ten players could be found. CDT I, 473 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006).
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government could agree to use a hashing program to retrieve the file
without viewing any other files in the computer. 191
This negotiation process will encourage the government to develop
efficient search methods that take into account the privacy concerns raised
by digital searches while discouraging the existing temptation to claim that
a file-by-file search is required in all cases. The process does, however,
require that magistrate judges take an active role in scrutinizing warrant
applications and ensuring a balance. Magistrates are increasingly familiar
with digital searches and have been addressing the issues they pose for over
a decade. 192 Although there is reason to expect that not all judges will
enforce this system aggressively enough, 193 the benefits are significant, and
the appellate courts should attempt to coordinate and guide the magistrate
judges as much as is possible.
C. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. AND REASONABLENESS

Due to the heuristic nature of the Lerner Formula, it is difficult to
conclusively say whether or not the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
holding is incorrect. However, the process used to reach it was undesirable,
and it is clearly not an appropriate approach for all digital searches. The
government’s search of the CDT and Quest records did raise several
sources of privacy cost. The records were quasi-medical in nature and
belonged to numerous third parties not under immediate suspicion of drug
use. 194 If such searches were permitted in the future, it might be impossible
for the $620 million drug testing industry to remain operational due to their
inability to guarantee the confidentiality of their test results.195 The search

191
See, e.g., United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2010) (suspect
is detected sharing particular files using a peer-to-peer file-sharing program and investigators
conduct a search of his computer).
192
Supra Part IV.C.
193
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881, 888–89 (1991) (describing the modern warrant process as “slapdash” and
“casual”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 (1988) (calling “the ‘rubber stamp’ quality of
magistrate review of warrant applications”an “open scandal”).
194
On the other hand, Barry Bonds did not believe that his results were confidential, and
was concerned that Major League Baseball would leak his results to the media if they felt it
necessary to do so. See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 127. Nonetheless, all
participating players had been promised confidentiality by Major League Baseball and had
been told that the purpose of the testing was to see if more than five percent of them tested
positive, in which case further screening would be used. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 993.
195
MARKETDATA ENTERPRISES, INC., THE U.S. MEDICAL LABORATORIES INDUSTRY 10
(9th ed. 2007) (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology).
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of CDT and Quest carried what can be assumed to be well above-average
privacy costs.
Those privacy costs were not outweighed by the probability variable or
the social costs of undetected crime. Although the records were sure to
contain drug testing results for the ten players, it is unclear whether or not it
was strongly likely that those results would be positive. The Government
was investigating BALCO, a company that had specialized in developing
undetectable performance-enhancing drugs. 196 Furthermore, as Judge
Thomas noted in his dissent in CDT I, a positive result would not have been
conclusive proof of drug use. 197 Additionally, the crime under investigation
was not of a particularly severe nature, and did not immediately threaten
human life. 198 Finally, just as the police in Winston could have proven the
suspect’s involvement in an armed robbery without retrieving the bullet, the
BALCO investigation could likely have demonstrated the drug use of the
targeted players without accessing the CDT databases.199
The Ninth Circuit approach does not strike an appropriate balance
under the Lerner Formula. Although the above-average privacy costs of the
government search in this case require mitigation, it is not at all clear that
all of the procedures required by the Ninth Circuit are necessary to restore
the balance. Simply requiring the government to develop a search protocol
that could be reasonably expected to retrieve only the test results of the
targeted players would have been sufficient to reduce the privacy costs to
adequate levels. As Judge Bea noted in his partial dissent, the drug test
results of the ten players were located within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet,
along with many other baseball players. 200 However, the spreadsheet, when
opened, only immediately displayed the names of the players; viewing the
test results required investigators to scroll right. Therefore, investigators
could have easily adopted a search protocol whereby they would remove
the results of the other baseball players before scrolling and viewing the test
results. 201 It is therefore difficult to see how the additional procedural

196

See supra note 5.
473 F.3d 915, 945 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
198
In contrast, Justice Jackson’s dissent in United States v. Brinegar uses the example of
a kidnapped child to demonstrate a crime carrying high social costs. 338 U.S. 160, 183
(1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
199
The Government may have been able to use the seized records of BALCO or obtain
the cooperation of Victor Conte or other intermediaries to establish the use of performanceenhancing drugs by the ten players. FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2.
200
CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1016 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
201
Id.
197
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requirements advanced by the Ninth Circuit would produce anything more
than marginal reductions in privacy cost. 202
And while the redundancy of the Ninth Circuit procedures creates
marginal benefits, they risk making all digital searches significantly more
difficult and expensive to conduct.203 For instance, the requirement that
only specialized personnel be allowed to perform file segregation is
unrealistic and expensive if applied to every digital search. 204 To properly
segregate pertinent files from non-pertinent files typically requires detailed
knowledge of the investigation.205 This is especially true in the execution
202
The Ninth Circuit’s minimization procedures resemble (and probably exceed) the
procedures regulating searches of records intermingled with documents protected by
attorney–client privilege. These procedures include the use of “taint teams” or requiring
searches to be conducted by magistrates in camera. See, e.g., Klitzman, Klitzman and
Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing the use of a special master to
review documents seized from a law firm in camera); United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp.
890, 905 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (upholding segregation by “taint team”). Searches of records
protected by attorney–client privilege carry extremely high privacy costs since they threaten
to undermine constitutional rights to counsel. Although the search of CDT’s drug records
raise serious privacy concerns, it is difficult to see how the Ninth Circuit could conclude that
the privacy costs were so high that search minimization procedures equal to or perhaps
greater than those granted to searches of attorney–client communications were necessary.
For an excellent discussion of searches of documents containing intermingled privileged
documents, see Eric D. McArthur, Comment, The Search and Seizure of Privileged
Attorney–Client Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 732 (2005) (comparing the
privacy costs of searches of privileged documents to the compulsory surgery in Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)).
203
The holding requiring the destruction of non-pertinent data, inasmuch as it applies to
data not otherwise retainable under plain view, is uncontroversial. CDT II, 579 F.3d at
1000–01. This seems clear under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) and implicit in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, given the lack of any legitimate governmental interest in retaining information
unlawfully obtained and therefore “poisonous” to the investigation if utilized. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1963).
204
CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000; see id. at 1013 (Callahan, J. concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (“To comply, an agency would have to expand its personnel, likely at a significant
cost, to include both computer specialists who could segregate data and forensic computer
specialists who could assist in the subsequent investigation. The alternative would be to use
an independent third party consultant, which no doubt carries its own significant expense.”).
205
See EOGHAN CASEY DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE,
COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET 90 (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]he success of [the investigative]
process depends heavily on the experience and skill of the investigators, evidence examiners
and crime scene technicians who must collaborate to piece the evidence together and
develop a convincing account of the offense.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 101–02, 102
fig.4.5 (listing the steps taken by investigators and examiners “working together” in the
course of a digital investigation). See generally ASS’N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, GOOD
PRACTICES GUIDE FOR COMPUTER BASED ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 24 (2003), available at
http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf
(describing the analytical process by which the forensic examiner or other personnel review
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of warrants for particular types of evidence, rather than known items or
files.
For instance, imagine a search warrant granted by a magistrate to
search and seize “hardware, computer disks, [and] disk drives . . . which
may be, or are used to visually depict child pornography, child erotica,
information pertaining to the sexual interest in child pornography . . . or
information pertaining to an interest in child pornography.”206 An
experienced investigator with superior knowledge of the case at hand would
be more (perhaps much more) likely to identify “information pertaining to
an interest in child pornography” than a technician whose only involvement
in the case is to extract and sort information from digital storage media. To
insist on such a requirement in all “normal[]” 207 digital search cases is
simply unrealistic, which is why no such requirement exists in traditional
searches. 208 In failing to evaluate reasonableness through a balancing of
social interests and privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit has created an
unsustainable system where the ability of the government to conduct
efficient investigations arbitrarily depends on whether or not the evidence is
digital or non-digital. 209
D. EX ANTE SEARCH RESTRICTIONS

Professor Orin S. Kerr, a leading scholar on the Fourth Amendment
implications of digital searches, has recently published an article
responding to the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision. 210 The paper
creates two categories of responses to the constitutional questions raised by
collects digital information for probative value after it has been retrieved by a forensic
examiner).
206
United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998).
207
CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000.
208
For instance, the officers in Arizona v. Hicks were not required, after arresting the
defendant, to send in “specialized personnel or an independent third party” to search the
apartment for weapons or dead bodies. 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987).
209
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 08-5000, 2010 WL 251592, at *10 (4th Cir.
Jan. 21, 2010) (concluding that searches of digital databases are not distinguishable from
searches of filing cabinets on the basis of the amount of information inside database); Recent
Case, supra note 40, at 1010 (“There is no justification for applying different standards to
information contained in the same document depending on whether that document is still on
a computer or has been printed out.”).
210
Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV.
1241 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation]. In addition to extensive writings on
digital searches, cited supra, Professor Kerr authored the Department of Justice’s guidelines
on digital searches. ORIN S. KERR, SEARCHING & SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1st ed. 2001), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps11361/searchmanual.pdf.
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digital searches: ex ante restrictions and ex post restrictions. Ex ante
restrictions are conditions such as those established by the Ninth Circuit,
which dictate to the manner in which the search is to be conducted.211 Ex
post restrictions are court decisions and precedents which limit the
admissibility of evidence after the search has occurred. 212 An example
would be the review of the actions of the officer in Hicks and the finding of
noncompliance with the Fourth Amendment based on his moving of the
turntable during the search.
Professor Kerr argues that ex post restrictions should be the only tool
at the disposal of courts for enforcing Fourth Amendment protections in
digital search cases (or, apparently, any kind of government search). First,
Professor Kerr argues that magistrate judges lack authority to impose ex
ante requirements other than particularity and probable cause.213 Professor
Kerr bases this assessment on a set of Supreme Court cases that, while not
specifically addressing the authority of magistrates to establish ex ante
restrictions in all cases, would seem to bring it into some doubt. For
instance, in the context of anticipatory warrants, the Court has rejected the
argument that, in addition to the requirements of probable cause and
particularity, there exists a requirement that the circumstances activating the
warrant also be particularly described, suggesting that particularity and
probable cause may be the only two requirements a magistrate can place on
a search warrant. 214 It has also held that magistrates cannot uphold their
duties while directly participating in searches as if they were an “adjunct
law enforcement officer” 215 and that a warrant for a wiretap does not require
additional language authorizing the act of entering the target’s residence to
Additionally, in Richards v.
install the surveillance equipment.216
Wisconsin, the Court cast doubt on whether or not ex ante restrictions are
enforceable at all, when it upheld a search that disregarded an ex ante
requirement to “knock and announce” prior to entering a suspect’s hotel
room. 217

211

See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1243–44.
Id. at 1261.
213
Id.
214
See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006).
215
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 321 (1979). This case involved a
magistrate who assisted a search for obscene materials by going to the adult bookstore with
the officer, reviewing the obscene material seized there, and informing the searching officers
of whether or not the materials met the constitutional requirements for obscenity. Id. at 321.
216
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
217
520 U.S. 385 (1997).
212
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Professor Kerr further argues that, regardless of the authority of
magistrates to impose enforceable ex ante restrictions, ex ante restrictions
are normatively undesirable and should be avoided. Professor Kerr argues
that, unlike ex post restrictions, ex ante restrictions tend to limit the ability
for appellate courts to aid in the development of law in an area of law that is
in need of more clarity as to what is and is not reasonable. 218 The
reasonableness determinations required for ex ante restrictions must also be
made at a phase of an investigation where only a limited amount of
information is available to the magistrate. The number of digital media to
be searched, their formatting, the likelihood of encryption, and other
variables may not be known until the search is conducted, limiting the
accuracy of reasonableness determinations and introducing constitutional
error. 219 Professor Kerr concludes that, in the face of these difficulties, ex
ante restrictions should be avoided.
Professor Kerr’s arguments are provocative and deserve a more
thorough review than this Comment can provide. Ex ante search
restrictions, while not apparently adopted by the Supreme Court, have been
adopted by several courts of appeals 220 and a scattering of district courts. 221
Prohibiting them would result in the reversal of a significant swathe of
appellate Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Professor Kerr concedes that the Supreme Court has not issued a
definitive ruling on whether or not ex ante restrictions are permissible,
leaving some room for debate. 222 However, the approach advocated in this
Comment circumvents that debate.
The ex ante requirements of
particularity and probable cause are clearly permitted and this Comment’s
approach is grounded in probable cause. A magistrate reviewing a search
warrant must assure that the probable cause requirement is met, and he
cannot know what level of probable cause is required without assessing the
overall reasonableness of the search. Magistrates have the authority to deny
218

Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1277–78.
Id.
220
The ex ante Tamura procedure is still valid precedent in the Ninth Circuit and has
received positive appraisals in the Third and Tenth Circuits. See United States v. NinetyTwo Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars, 307 F.3d 137, 154 (3d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the Third Circuit
has advocated ex ante restrictions in the context of searches of law firm documents. See
Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984); see also United
States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington D.C. 20515, 497 F.3d
654, 656 (D.C. Cir 2007) (reviewing a government search pursuant to a warrant requiring
“special procedures” for the search of a congressman's office).
221
See supra note 119.
222
Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1270.
219
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search warrants where the probable cause requirement is not met. To the
extent that the approach advocated in this Comment may result in ex ante
restrictions on searches, it is important to note that those restrictions are
self-imposed by the officials requesting the warrant, not the magistrate, who
simply adjusts the probable cause required based on the reasonableness of
the proposed search.
This raises the question of the impact of Richards v. Wisconsin on the
enforceability of ex ante search restrictions, since that case leaves the issue
in some doubt. Further clarification by the Supreme Court may be
necessary, but, at present, the case seems distinguishable from most digital
search cases. The Richards v. Wisconsin case involved a “knock and
announce” requirement and rejected its use as an ex ante requirement. 223
The “unannounced” entry occurred immediately after an officer attempted
to enter a suspect’s hotel room disguised as hotel staff. The suspect opened
the door, noticed other officers in the hallway and slammed the door.224 At
that point, due to the exigent circumstances and immediate potential for
destruction of evidence (as implied by the slamming of the door) the
reasonableness factors were significantly different than they had been when
the magistrate issued the warrant. Thus, the primary failure of the
requirement in that case stemmed from the fact that the magistrate
purported to evaluate the reasonableness of a particular aspect of a search
(the reasonableness of unannounced entry) at a point in time in which the
magistrate did not have sufficient information to make such a judgment.
Digital searches are not nearly as volatile. Once the electronic media
has been seized, it is fairly immune to destruction (unless the suspect has
imposed highly sophisticated countermeasures). The reasonableness factors
surrounding the search do not change as much as they do in the
circumstances presented in Richards. Thus, Richards is more clearly
understood as a limit on arbitrary or unsupported ex ante requirements, not
all ex ante requirements.
Beyond the question of inherent constitutional authority, there seems
to be some authorization in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for ex
ante restrictions in the context of digital searches. Rule 41(e)(2)(B) was
specifically created by a 2009 amendment to provide additional direction on
warrants for electronically stored information.225 The rule notes that
223
224
225

520 U.S. 385, 388 (1996).
Id.
The rule provides:

A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the
seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant
authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant. The time for

1626

VINCENT ANGERMEIER

[Vol. 100

although officers only need one warrant in order to both seize or copy
electronic media and then review that material, that is only the default rule.
If the magistrate “otherwise specifie[s]” then the default does not apply,
meaning that a magistrate can authorize the initial seizure, but stay the
review of the material. 226
In an ex post-only system, this carve out would make little sense. If
the probable cause and particularity requirements justified the seizure, then
there would be no justification for delaying a review of the seized material.
Rather, this “otherwise specified” clause seems to provide for magistrates to
develop a two-step warrant process, whereby a magistrate first issues a
warrant authorizing the seizure and then, once there has been an opportunity
to more closely assess the reasonableness of searching the seized media,
issues a second warrant permitting the search of the seized material. This
two-phase system allows for the creation of post-seizure ex ante restrictions
that are more likely to create real reductions in privacy cost than merely
speculative ones. It is difficult to see what purpose it would serve in an ex
post-only regime and so seems to strongly infer that magistrates are
authorized to exercise ex ante authority in some cases.
Professor Kerr’s normative criticisms of ex ante restrictions make a
persuasive case for at least limiting their use. This Comment shares his
concern with the potential for a one-size-fits-all system of ex ante search
restrictions (such as the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. restrictions) to
result in constitutional error. That is why this Comment’s approach ideally
places the government in the metaphorical driver’s seat while the magistrate
simply serves to let the government know when it has reached the
destination. The two-step process implied by Rule 41(e)(2)(B) provides an
additional method for reducing constitutional error. Once the computers
have been seized, the magistrate is able to make a reasonableness
determination with improved information about the amount of information
seized and its potential to impose privacy costs. There may even be an
opportunity to conduct a full hearing, with briefings from both the
government and the suspect regarding the reasonableness of the search.
Additionally, once the data has been seized, the magistrate is in a better
position to evaluate the effect of government-proposed ex ante restrictions,
should they be found to be necessary. The approach advocated in this
Comment allows for adaptations that can reduce constitutional error.

executing the warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of
the media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or review.
226

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B).
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Similarly, Professor Kerr’s concern that permitting ex ante restrictions
will retard the development of reasonableness case law in digital search
cases is much more applicable to the blanket restrictions imposed by the
Ninth Circuit, rather than the approach advocated in this Comment. While
it is impossible to know how often magistrates using this Comment’s
approach would find it necessary to impose ex ante restrictions, it seems
unlikely that it will happen in most cases. Magistrates should not entertain
ex ante restrictions whenever they feel it would be helpful to do so; they
only come into play when the government’s requested search would violate
the constitution without revision. Furthermore, as Professor Kerr notes in
his paper, magistrates can be somewhat cursory in their review of search
warrant requests. 227 This would probably result in most digital searches
proceeding only with ex post restrictions, with the ex ante restrictions
reserved for exceptionally problematic searches, such as the Comprehensive
Drug Testing Inc. search. Thus, to the extent that ex ante restrictions may
limit the ability of appellate courts to develop the law, a majority of digital
searches will be likely to be conducted with no ex ante restrictions,
providing appellate courts with ample opportunity to develop a case law
surrounding the reasonableness of digital searches.
In general, the approach advocated in this Comment seeks to resolve
the central problem of digital searches: the creation of circumstances where
magistrates must choose between society’s need to investigate and deter the
growing number of crimes involving computers and the peculiar privacy
costs caused by the massive intermingling of data on electronic media. Ex
ante restrictions, despite the name, actually serve the purpose of allowing
government searches that would not otherwise be permissible to go forward
while ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements
are satisfied. Unlike ex post restrictions, they can be selected based both on
their convenience to the investigators and their potential for reductions in
privacy cost. They also will tend to provide some guidance to investigators
in complex or novel digital investigations, providing a path forward that
reduces the risk of an important investigation being sacrificed at the altar of
ex post reasonableness case law.
E. REASONABLENESS AND PRACTICALITY

The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. holding clearly springs from
the concern that, by combining plain view with the ostensible need to
conduct file-by-file searches, the government has discovered a major

227

See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1283.
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loophole to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 228 However, it is
important not to overestimate the value of this system to the government.
Under the plain view doctrine, investigators must have probable cause to
believe that an item seized has an “immediately apparent” connection to an
illegal act. 229 Traditional examples of items satisfying the requirement
include firearms in the homes of known felons, modified rifles, marijuana
seeds, and child pornography. 230 In contrast, establishing the requirement
for documents seized in plain view can be a very difficult task. 231 Very few
computer files are contraband in nature, with child pornography being the
primary exception.232 Similarly, most other files on computers are textbased documents and thus have the same difficulty meeting the requirement
as their physical counterparts, namely, the need for further inspection to
develop the context for probable cause. 233 For example, an officer
searching a computer for evidence of a kidnapping would not find a
fraudulent tax return to be immediately apparent. 234 Since the “immediately
228

See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The sequence of events supports the
suspicion that representations in the warrant about the necessity for broad authority to seize
materials were designed to give the government access to the full list of professional baseball
players and their confidential drug testing records.”). Judge Kozinski has indicated that his
skepticism towards plain view may extend to non-digital contexts as well. See supra note
42.
229
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 466 (1971); see also United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 510 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“The immediately apparent requirement is a vital constraint on the plain view exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”).
230
See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 4 (1982) (marijuana seeds); United
States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010) (machine gun and silencer); United
States v. Lemus, 582 F.3d 958, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (known felon with firearm); United
States v. Norris, No. CR 05-2323-TUC-CKJ, 2006 WL 798667, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24,
2006) (modified firearm).
231
See, e.g., Garcia, 496 F.3d at 511 (discussing documents requiring “further
investigation” and not establishing probable cause of crime upon “immediate sensory
perception” not immediately apparent); United States v. Jimenez, 205 Fed. Appx. 656, 662
n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that, “unlike firearms in a felon’s residence, letters do not
immediately appear to be evidence of a crime”); Doane v. United States, No. 08 Mag.
0017(HBP), 2009 WL 1619642, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2009); see also United States v.
Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 586–87 (D. Vt. 1998) (surveying document-based case law
predating the probable cause requirement defined in Hicks).
232
See Clancy, supra note 125, at 201.
233
See Garcia, 496 F.3d at 511. There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule.
See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2010) (mobile device seized incident to arrest
displays image of owner, a known felon, holding a firearm).
234
See also Ziff, supra note 125, at 869 (positing that investigators undertaking a digital
search for child pornography could open a file called “letter-to-grandma.doc” on the grounds
that it might contain images of child pornography, but that the investigators could not justify
reading any text contained within that document).
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apparent” requirement cannot be satisfied retroactively and must be
established for every single file seized under plain view, the valid seizure of
non-pertinent digital evidence would be rare.235 Even in Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., it is possible that many of the non-BALCO drug records
discovered would not meet this test due to legal or legitimate explanations
for the test results observed by the officers. 236
The finite resources of investigators pose an additional limit on digital
plain view. As has been noted, pertinent files can easily be disguised and
only discovered by a detailed, file-by-file search. However, as memory
capacity increases at a rapid pace, such searches become increasingly
difficult to perform. 237 File-by-file searches must proceed without regard to
file names, formats, or creation dates, since they are premised on the theory
that those are unreliable. 238 Indeed, at least one court has concluded that
these file-by-file searches cannot open files with names indicative of
unrelated crimes, due to the unlikelihood of a criminal disguising a file by
giving it an incriminating name. 239 Investigators thus have a strong
incentive to avoid conducting file-by-file searches in many instances.
However, each procedure must be transparent for these limitations to
be effective. Perjury by officers is a significant threat to Fourth
Amendment protections, due to the large number of exceptions to the
warrant requirement. 240 Those concerns are heightened in the digital search
235

See id. at 867; United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1985).
See CDT I, 473 F.3d 915, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“It was clear
under the testing protocol that positive tests did not necessarily reflect steroid use; the use of
nutritional supplements—which is common in professional sports—could also yield a false
positive. In addition, there are a whole host of legitimate reasons for individuals to be
prescribed steroid products.”).
237
PETER GRABOWSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 70 (2d ed. 2007); Ziff, supra note 125, at
860–61 (describing a search by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office that required 200
terabytes of information to be searched, which is equivalent to a 4,200 mile-high stack of
paper). But see Kerr, supra note 125 at 569–70 (noting that computer searches are
somewhat easier to conduct than physical searches of a residence, because they can be done
by one person and the search does not have to be done in the field).
238
See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding
file-by-file search on grounds that it was conducted systematically, opening files in the order
in which they appeared in the directory, regardless of their name); accord United States v.
Mann, 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010).
239
See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding
that officers conducting a search for documents related to tax fraud lacked probable cause to
believe that encrypted files with names suggestive of child pornography might contain
information pertinent to their search).
240
See Stuntz, supra note 193, at 938 (“If the law prevents perjury in cases of one type
but not of another, a dishonest officer can simply re-describe the case changing his story to
take advantage of whatever opportunities the law gives him.”); see also Christopher
236
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context, since digital searches are conducted in private settings, where no
independent witness can dispute an officer’s testimony. Additionally, while
a judge may be able to detect inconsistencies in perjured testimony
regarding a conventional search, they may have more difficulty doing so in
a highly technical context. Therefore, a defendant in a digital search case
must be allowed to analyze the search methods used by the government to
determine whether the government discovered illicit materials by
conducting improper searches—that is, searches that are not conducted in a
systematic manner. 241 Technology has made creating these records simple
and inexpensive. 242 Recording software can easily and unobtrusively
record the process of a hard drive search. 243 Furthermore, the use of
bitstream copies allows digital searches to be replicated—a police
technician could be asked to state the search procedure that was used to
discover a particular piece of evidence and then asked to demonstrate how
that evidence was discovered on a copy of the target hard drive. 244 Such a
process would give defense counsel many opportunities to detect violations
of Fourth Amendment rights and found a suppression motion on it.245
Still, even though the potential for widespread abuse of digital plain
view is limited by finite resources, it is not a complete solution.
Government investigators may hold their resources in reserve, and use them

Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037
(1996).
241
For example, abandoning a search for evidence of drug distribution to search for child
pornography. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
242
See, e.g., DemoCreator: Record Everything on Computer Screen and Create Engaged
Simulations,
WONDERSHARE
SOFTWARE,
http://sameshow.com/images/brochure/
democreator-brochurex.pdf (offering retail software for recording computer activity).
243
Id.
244
Note that this ability to scrutinize the search step-by-step goes a long way towards
resolving Judge Kozinski’s concerns about abuse of plain view in conventional searches,
particularly the ability of officers to lie about how they came to view objects. See supra
note 41.
245
However, courts have so far been reluctant to require agents to keep records of search
progress and to require those records be provided to defendants. See United States v. Jack,
No. CR.S-07-0266 FCD, 2009 WL 453051, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (denying a
discovery motion for search methodology on grounds that warrant permitted government to
open every file on computer); United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1265 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (finding it unnecessary to maintain record of text searches conducted by agents in face
of agent testimony that the searches pertained to the issues raised in the warrant). But see
United States v. Frabizio, 341 F. Supp. 2d 47, 47 (D. Mass. 2004) (granting motion under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) for discovery of computer search software used by government
to scan and detect child pornography on defendant’s computer).
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to target the unpopular or politically disfavored. 246 The Lerner Formula
requirements regarding reasonable searches are therefore indispensible.
However, these practical considerations support the proposition that digital
data storage and personal computing are not such a radical change from
existing criminal procedure doctrine that radically expanded protections are
necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid expansion of digital technology and its increasing use does
raise serious privacy considerations, including difficult questions
concerning government and private data mining, 247 cybervigilantism, 248
searches of digital media incident to arrest,249 RFID tracking, 250
biometrics, 251 and other technologies.252 Still, more of our private details

246

See Kerr, supra note 125, at 567 (“[T]he ability to engage in pretextual searches may
permit the police to target unpopular or politically powerless persons or groups for
heightened scrutiny . . . . This discriminatory and inefficient practice was just the kind of
misuse of government power the Fourth Amendment was created to stop.”). Arguably, the
federal investigation into Allegheny County Coroner Cyril Wecht represents an example of
this kind of abuse. See United States v. Wecht, 619 F. Supp. 2d 213, 248 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(finding warrant permitting seizure of laptop and all data stored within laptop overbroad in a
political corruption case); Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public
Confidence in Our Federal Justice System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary,
101st Cong. (2007) (Testimony of Fmr. Att’y Gen. Dick Thornburgh) (suggesting that the
prosecution of County Coroner Wecht, a Democrat, by a Republican U.S. Attorney was
politically motivated); Jason Cato, Prosecution’s Conduct in Wecht Case Labeled
“Troubling,” PITTSBURG TRIBUNE-REV. (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/news/s_562027.html.
247
See SOLOVE, supra note 142; Christopher W. Clifton, et al., Data Mining and
Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
CONVERSATION 191 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006).
248
See United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Steiger,
318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003); PETER GRABOSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 98–102 (2006).
249
See Adam M. Gershowitz, The IPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 27 (2008); see, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, No. 3:08-CR-143, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71057 (E.D. Tenn. June 4, 2009).
250
See Ari Juels, RFID Privacy: A Technical Primer for the Non-Technical Reader, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 57–73
(Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006). RFID is an acronym for “RadioFrequency Identification.” An “RFID tag” is a tiny, inexpensive chip that transmits a
uniquely identifying number over short distances. Id. at 57. Their increasing ubiquity is
raising privacy concerns in several areas. See, e.g., M.L. Wald, New High-Tech Passports
Raise Concerns of Snooping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at 28.
251
See Lisa S. Nelson, Constructing Policy: The Unsettled Question of Biometric
Technology and Privacy, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSSDISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 152–72 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds.,
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are becoming digitized. Technology will continue to develop new ways
that that information can be stored, distributed, seized and stolen.
Therefore, it is important that the courts adopt a flexible approach, similar
to the flexible approach used in many conventional searches. By working
to balance public interests with privacy interests on a case-by-case basis,
magistrates can encourage the efficient administration of justice and
constitutional protections. While Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
proposes a solution that may work in extreme cases, it is not appropriate in
all cases. Its impracticality risks ceding the argument to the more
conventional approaches of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, which
themselves may be inadequate to protect Fourth Amendment rights in all
cases. A flexible approach based on balancing of interests presents the
most sustainable option for courts seeking to address the Fourth
Amendment concerns raised by digital searches.

2006). Popular culture has begun to reflect concerns regarding biometric privacy. See, e.g.,
MINORITY REPORT (Amblin Entertainment 2002).
252
See U.S. v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 853–55 (2d Cir. 1990) (Weinstein, J. dissenting)
(listing technological improvements in forensic science and expressing concern about the
Fourth Amendment implications of their aggregated use).

